How do we count officer losses and what are the conditions and limitations of our list.
NOTE #1: All information in this article is accurate as of 27. October 2023.
NOTE #2: The team of volunteers participating in this project does not include military specialists. All information below is based on the degree of understanding of the team, and it is recommended that it should be reviewed by a military specialist.
Data organization
Information in the KIU database is organized in two tabs:
Ranks
This is the main data tab. In this tab, the names of confirmed killed in action (KIA) Russian officers are organized in columns:- Columns A to J feature names of officers of the corresponding army ranks, sorted by seniority, beginning with the lowest ranked officers. Column A features names of Lieutenants. Column J features names of Generals of the Army (currently empty).
- The names of Junior Lieutenants have been separated into a new column recently (column L). More information on this officer rank will be provided below.
- Column K features names of officers of an unknown rank. These are casualties confirmed to have been commissioned officers, but no conclusive evidence is available of their highest attained military rank.
- Column M and column N feature names of reserve and retired officers. These are officers who were no longer actively serving as officers at the time they were KIA. They had either returned as volunteers (in the armed forces or in a private military company), or they had been mobilized, and they did not perform duties corresponding to their highest attained military rank.
Sources
This is the tab in which additional details are provided for each officer included in the list. Information here is organized in the following manner:- Columns B to E serve as data aid in order for the dataset to be more easily exportable.
- Columns F to H provide context as to the specialized military unit the corresponding officer belonged to, including internal military forces (column F), PMC Wagner (column G), and intelligence services (column H).
- In column I you can find links to the Twitter/X post for each officer, and in column J you can find the corresponding dates of publication. Public posts have not been made for all entries in the dataset.
- Column K features links to the original sources quoted in the corresponding Twitter/X posts. Column L features additional sources, which have not been included with the Twitter/X posts.
- Column M features a “1” placeholder when a memorial of any sort is available for the corresponding officer. Such memorials are one of the few indisputable proofs of death available via open sources.
- Column N features general notes, for extra context.
- Column O provides the military unit and the actual position of each officer in the dataset. This information is often unavailable, incomplete, or inconclusive.
- Column P displays the known date of death for each officer. The date of death in this column is based on public sources. This information was not actively collected in the very beginning of the project, and therefore it is incomplete. For this reason, column Q presents information collected independently by one of our team members (@splussi). There are occasional discrepancies between the two sets of data, stemming from differences in sourcing. However, such discrepancies rarely amount to more than a few days.
Conditions for inclusion
The minimum requirement for inclusion in the dataset is that all of the following conditions are met:- A soldier is confirmed killed in Ukraine or by the Ukrainian armed forces, and the death has occurred in direct relation to the war in Ukraine, on or after 24. February 2022,
- Confirmation of death comes from a Russian, or Russia-affiliated, source (the vast majority of all entries), or it must be accompanied by photographic evidence (less than 1 % of all entries),
- A soldier is confirmed to have served in the Russian armed forces, a Russian military unit, or a military organization related to the Russian armed forces at the time of death,
- A soldier is confirmed to have held the rank of a commissioned officer of the Russian armed forces at some point before he/she was KIA.
Herein, a definition is required of what constitutes a “deserving officer” — two ways exist in which a (prospective) soldier can attain the rank of officer in the Russian armed forces:
- They could graduate from an officer course in a Russian military academy. This condition is met by most entries in this dataset.
- They could be promoted to a junior officer rank after a lengthy service with the Russian armed forces, based on exceptional merits, and/or based on attaining additional academic qualification. In most cases these are ensigns (Praporshchiks or Senior Praporshchiks) promoted to Junior Lieutenants, and in very rare cases — to Lieutenants. This condition applies to all Junior Lieutenants in the dataset, and to a handful of Lieutenants. Overall, it represents approximately 2 % of the dataset entries.
Донецкое высшее общевойсковое командное училище (DHCACS / ДонВОКУ). Due to the current administrative ambiguity of the city of Donetsk, DHCACS graduates are not included in the main dataset.
In the context above, Russian armed forces and related military organizations include all branches of the Russian military-proper (Army, Navy, Aerospace Forces, Airborne Forces), National Guard (OMON, SOBR, other forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, other internal military forces), military and paramilitary organizations associated with the Russian armed forces (PMC Wagner, PMC Redut / Redoubt, BARS, and others).
Limitations and challenges
While a great effort has been made in order to ensure completeness and accuracy of the data, a number of limitations must be pointed out:Difficulties in rank confirmation
In many instances, the exact rank of a killed soldier is not provided together with a death announcement or an obituary. Thus, for a substantial percentage of all known KIA soldiers, the rank is not immediately known. Data about ranks can be extrapolated with a high degree of confidence from soldier photos and from memorial monuments. However, mistakes are possible even in epitaphs, and in instances where an extrapolated rank does not match the corresponding expectations, a soldier might not get included in the main dataset. An example would be a 19-year old soldier in a Major rank insignia uniform.Rank confirmation has become especially complicated after September 2022 when army ranks began to be refilled with reserve soldiers. While active duty soldiers have relatively recent, in-uniform photos, such photos are not always available for reserve or retired soldiers.
Lack of a reliable Russian source
Over 99 % of the entries in the dataset are supported by at least one Russian source. In some cases a Russian source may be determined as unreliable or hard to validate. When a degree of ambiguity exists, an entry might get excluded from the main dataset. Most non-Russian claims of death, unsupported by a Russian source, are excluded from the list. An exception is a case where a killed Russian soldier can be identified by name and rank via direct photographic evidence.Ambiguity of occurrence of death and/or cause of death
In certain cases, a soldier does not get declared dead, even if they have been missing for months. Due to the ambiguity of the destiny of such soldiers, they are usually not included in the main dataset. An exception might be made in cases where an aircraft crew is missing after an aircraft has been shot down in territory controlled by the Russian armed forces, or when a soldier is missing after an ammunition depot, where they have been located, explodes.In some cases, the cause of death is not explicitly given as “killed in action.” In particular, it is difficult to determine the cause of death solely based on photos of tombstones. If a grave photo features a soldier’s uniform, or if a grave is claimed (by a Russian source) to be one of a soldier, unless an additional source is provided, if the age of the deceased is sufficient to merit suspicion as to the cause of death, the entry may not get included in the main dataset.
Linguistic challenges
Most of the original collected data are in the Russian language. Not all of the volunteers helping in the collection and organization of data are native Russian speakers, thus a linguistic barrier exists. Furthermore, certain regions of Russia use languages other than Russian, with which none of the volunteers are familiar. Most common is the problem with the use of Tatar language and Tuvan language, but this may be a product of Internet activity, rather than overall usage volume.Official policy variations
Substantial variations exist in terms of casualty announcement policies of local authorities. Authorities in certain federal subjects of Russia proactively and frequently report on known killed soldiers. Thus, it is believed that the majority of all KIA soldiers from Saratov Oblast, Tuva, and Primorsky Krai, are known. However, the authorities in most other federal subjects are not as proactive and forthcoming. It is believed that significant data gaps exist in relation to KIA soldiers from Krasnodar Krai and most of the Caucasus administrative areas.Internet use levels and media activity
In most cases, a death announcement is made by an official regional administration representative or by a relative. The death may be confirmed via the announcement of a posthumously awarded medal, or by the unveiling of a memorial or other monument of killed soldiers. However, unless any of these events is depicted and reported either in social media or by a conventional media outlet, the event cannot become known outside of the circle of physical attendees and their immediate acquaintances. Thus, lower levels of Internet use and media activity in certain areas affect the corresponding knowledge of reported KIA officers. This limitation applies to most of the Caucasus region, as well as to rural areas of central and far east Russia.Unclear or incomplete photo/video coverage
In some instances, information can be derived from event footage — school events, award ceremonies, unveiling of monuments, and other activities. However, sometimes publicly available footage may not display fully the usable information from the event. For instance, images may be available only from certain parts of a memorial alley where multiple memorial plaques have been unveiled, or video may be available only of parts of an awards ceremony where relatives of several soldiers are handed the posthumous awards of their dead relatives. In yet other cases, only poor quality footage is publicly available.Information hiding
For various reasons, central or local authorities may decide to proactively hide the death of a soldier. This is likely to be practiced more commonly with regards to high-ranking officers due to the higher propaganda value of such deaths. The ratio of properly announced Colonel deaths near the time of death to the total number of discovered killed Colonels is the lowest among all officer ranks. In incidents with high morale and propaganda value where multiple officers might have been killed simultaneously, the deaths may remain unacknowledged for a substantially longer period of time. This has been observed in regards with the sinking of the Moskva, and it is likely to be the case with the attack on the Black Sea Fleet Headquarters.Deaths indirectly related to actions of the Ukrainian armed forces
A number of prominent deaths may have an impact on the military conflict, but as they have not occurred as a direct result of publicly acknowledged actions of the Ukrainian armed forces, these entries have not been included in the dataset. Such incidents include the casualties of the Wagner mutiny, Stanislav Rzhitsky’s alleged assassination, alleged suicides of high-ranking officers, deaths due to alleged accidents, and aircraft crashes allegedly indirectly related to the war in Ukraine.10. Lack of clarity on the actual name
In many cases, the surname and the initials of the given name and the patronymic of a KIA soldier are available. These are commonly available as a result of photos of the uniform of a soldier or as a result of images of monuments. Such instances are included in the main dataset. Sometimes only the given name and a surname initial are available, and these instances are not included in the main dataset.Other sources of information
Due to the limitations described above, other challenges, and deliberate omissions, our dataset may not be ideal for many intended purposes. In order to supplement our data, the following additional sources are recommended:- Mediazona/BBC Russian Service: The most detailed and professional research on Russian casualties. This project is supported by multiple volunteers, including locals who investigate graveyards in Russia. This means that some of the information this resource gathers is not based on open sourcing. Specific information on killed senior officers (Lieutenant Colonels and higher ranks) is shared publicly. There are slight discrepancies between the methodology this project utilizes and our methodology.
- TopCargo200: The site features detailed information on senior Russian military officers (Majors and higher ranks). Each officer has his/her own web page. DPR and LPR high-ranking officers are also included in this resource.
- Горюшко (Goryushko): The most complete source on Russian casualties, fully based on open source information. Names and sources of all confirmed casualties are available in that list. The corresponding spreadsheet contains more details, but it does not get updated in real time.
- Poternet: Similar to Goryushko, this resource collects and features publicly available information about all Russian casualties. The information includes details on casualties going back to 2014.
- Mancer’s list: The list of Russian casualties (going back to 2014) of a Ukrainian volunteer.
- Duke Garland’s list: Duke Garland collects detailed information on aviation-related losses in the Russian army. This is probably the most complete and detailed list of such losses.
What this dataset cannot be used for
While it is tempting to use this dataset for various calculations, it is important to remember that it is only an approximation of the publicly available information about killed in action Russian officers. It is not a representation of the total number of killed officers in any way. The very high threshold required for inclusion in the dataset (self-reported losses) makes it all but certain that it is incomplete. Thus, the following are not valid extrapolations of data based on this dataset:Extrapolation of total number of KIA soldiers
This is the most commonly attempted extrapolation. However, multiple unknowns exist that cannot be replaced by meaningful assumptions. In addition to the aforementioned fact (that this list does not constitute a complete set of details of the total number of killed officers), one suspicion is that officer deaths get reported at a different rate than deaths of regular soldiers.Officer deaths are more likely to become known to the higher command structures in the army as they make a more significant difference on the battlefield. Additionally, officers are likely treated preferentially, including in evacuation operations. At the same time, deaths of high-ranking officers are more likely to not get announced due to their morale and propaganda value. Thus, junior officer deaths may be overreported as compared to the average rate of reporting of deaths across all levels of the army, while senior officer deaths may be underreported. The rate of overreporting and underreporting is impossible to guess.
Extrapolation of total number of KIA officers
In addition to the factors described above, the army rank of a substantial segment of the known KIA soldiers is not known. This makes it impossible to determine with any degree of certainty the number of already known KIA soldiers who might have been officers.This problem is likely more pronounced with regards to junior officers and with regards to reserve or retired officers. The assumed relative overreporting of junior officer deaths is thus negated, to some extent, by this factor.
Extrapolation of KIAs out of the total number of new officers graduating per year
According to Russia’s Ministry of Defence, as of 2017 there were 26 military academies and 9 branches of these academies. These academies produced approximately 2,000 officers per year. However, not all of these graduates are specialized in active battlefield-related operations, and not all graduates become professional soldiers. Thus, related extrapolations are invalid.What this dataset can be used for
On its own, this dataset can show relatively little. It needs to be supplemented with data from the sources recommended in section “Other sources of information”, official reports on casualties, open source data on equipment losses, financial reports, and other related information. A few ways in which this dataset can be helpful include:Attrition levels
A number of Russian army structure specifics make Russian officers exceedingly valuable. Such specifics include the lack of properly trained and sizable non-commissioned officer corps, strict top-down structure with limited duty and decision-making delegation, and narrow specialization of officers. Thus, officers in the Russian army are anything but expendable. According to various sources, Ukrainian snipers seek and target Russian officers. Taking out the commanding officer may result in an entire platoon getting frozen in place.The first two factors above make every officer more valuable, on average, than their counterpart in a NATO-standard army, or in the more modern units of the Ukrainian army. This is also the reason why direct numerical comparisons of the number of lost Russian and Ukrainian officers are inaccurate without making additional adjustments.
The last factor may be of particular importance. Due to the narrow specialization of officers, an officer in a motor rifle unit, responsible for logistics, would have to be replaced by another motor rifle logistics specialist. This can potentially exacerbate shortages in sections of the army that see higher attrition levels. Trends in such specialist losses may help in understanding the underperformance of certain units.
General and specific shortages
Certain units require substantially higher levels of specialization, unique skills, and practice. Serious gaps in these units are more likely to be filled by reactivated reserve/retired or non-combat specialist officers. This appears to be the case with regards to aerospace forces where attrition levels may have led to severe shortages. Cases of retired military pilots being reactivated have been observed from as early as mid-2022. In recent months cases of instructors and test pilots killed in action have been reported.A general shortage of unknown severity likely exists with regards to frontline position junior officers. This is evidenced by the substantially higher number of Junior Lieutenants reported killed in recent months. The Junior Lieutenant rank is rarely used in the modern Russian army. A graduate of a full-course military academy gets awarded the rank of Lieutenant. Thus, Junior Lieutenants are non-commissioned officers, promoted to the lowest officer position, usually for exceptional merit and only under special circumstances.
A total of 65 Junior Lieutenants killed in action have been identified so far. The dates of death of 58 of these newly promoted officers have been confirmed. Only 3 cases of killed Junior Lieutenants that occurred before September 2022 (the first 6 months of the war) are known. Half of the known cases (29 out of 58) have a date of death determined to be after the start of the 2023 counteroffensive of Ukraine (June 2023 onwards).
Trends and changes in strategy
Reliable information on known (by name) killed Russian soldiers exists. As of 20. October 2023, Mediazona/BBC report of 34 857 known KIA cases, while as of the same date, Goryushko’s list featured 33 540 known KIA cases. Followed over time, these figures, combined with the officer deaths dataset, can inform on trends in casualties and strategy adjustments.Additional reading and references
Russian officer deaths (Ragnar Bjartur Gudmundsson)Junior Officers on the Battlefields of Ukraine (Jan Kallberg, Ph.D.)
For NATO, Russian Officer Losses Matter (Jan Kallberg, Ph.D.)
RE: Russian Junior Officer Losses in Ukraine (Jan Kallberg, Ph.D.)
500 Days and Counting – What Junior Officers can learn from the Ukraine-Russia Conflict (Major Nick Rich)
On the strategy of the Russo-Ukrainian War, fall offensive (Mert Matsumoto, Ph.D.)
Corrections
- Deleted Mancer’s association with the censor.NET project, 28. October 2023